|
| 新电改背景下广东省售电侧恶性价格竞争机理研究——基于Bertrand竞价模型 |
| Research on vicious price competition mechanism of electricity sale market in Guangdong Province under new electricity market reform: based on Bertrand bidding model |
| 投稿时间：2017-06-01 |
| DOI：10.13259/j.cnki.eri.2019.03.004 |
| 中文关键词: 新电改 电力市场 售电企业 恶性价格竞争 Bertrand竞价模型 |
| 英文关键词:new electricity market reform electricity market electricity sale company vicious price competition Bertrand bidding model |
| 基金项目: |
|
| 摘要点击次数: 2748 |
| 全文下载次数: 3170 |
| 中文摘要: |
| 为理顺恶性价格竞争的形成机理，以广东省售电企业为研究对象，将售电企业分为有发电资产的第一类售电企业与无发电资产的第二类售电企业，通过建立Bertrand模型研究新电改背景下恶性价格竞争机理，并对售电企业进入或退出售电市场曲线进行了分析。结果表明：引入市场竞争后的售电侧有形成恶性价格竞争的可能性，相关部门应加以防范。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| In order to rationalize the formation mechanism of vicious price competition, electricity sale company was classified into two categories with affiliated power generation company or not. Taking the companies of Guangdong Province as the research objects, the mechanism of vicious price competition was studied with the establishment of Bertrand model. The curves of entrance or exit into the market for electricity sale company under new electricity market reform were analyzed. The results showed that electricity sale market had possibility for the appearance of vicious price competition and relevant department should prevent it. |
| HTML 查看全文 查看/发表评论 下载PDF阅读器 |
| 关闭 |
